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	 introduction	
Wim van de Donk
Excellencies,	Distinguished	Guests,	
It is an honour for me to be able to welcome you to this seventh 
edition of our annual lecture. As you have seen, the theme we have 
chosen for this year’s lecture is : ‘Saving globalization from its cheer-
leaders’. Those of you who were able to attend last year’s lecture will 
know that the Council is rather fond of the metaphor of dancing. You 
may remember the impressive performance that was given here on 
this stage by two of the most talented ballet-dancers we have here in 
the Netherlands. 
Unfortunately, I have bad news for those of you who were expect-
ing to see dancing again this year; we are not about to see some real 
cheerleaders. I am really sorry to disappoint you. However, there is 
some good news. We may not have managed to get any cheerleaders, 
but we have succeeded in securing a number of excellent and distin-
guished experts and speakers, who will be enlightening us about that 
topic, as important as it is complex, which we call globalization. We 
have moreover chosen to focus on the significance of globalization 
(both as a context and as a process) for the future of development aid.
Of course, I wouldn’t want to disappoint you too much. So I have 
chosen a few pictures that show the difficult human constructions 
that cheerleaders are able to build. They look as fragile as the new 
world order that is emerging as a consequence of the economic, tech-
nological, political, legal and technological drivers of globalization. 
At a time when we are witnessing a major crisis in the world’s finan-
cial and economic systems, I imagine that there is no one who still 
has to be convinced of the importance of the development of a new 
world order. Just like the constructions that those cheerleaders are 
able to build, globalisation is still a very fragile structure. To a large 
extent, therefore, it is still uncertain whether the global institutions 
that we are preparing really will prove able to address adequately the 
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kind of endeavours that are emerging in and from the multi-layered, 
complex and highly interdependent kind of world in which we find 
ourselves today. 
You are warmly welcomed to this lecture. We as a Council, I believe, 
have a duty to help prepare future government policy and strategy 
for and within that new world order. Of course, we as a nation are 
fully aware that globalization is by no means a new phenomenon. It 
is, however, accelerating at a very rapid pace. It may be that none of 
us could have imagined this ten years ago. Globalization is the new 
setting in which all kinds of ‘national’ questions for future policy-
making are being posed and, perhaps, answered. I say ‘perhaps’, 
because it might be too early for answers yet; in fact, we may even 
be forced to admit that we still need to find the right questions to 
ask about the phenomenon. Whatever the case may be, one thing is 
certain: for both intelligent questions and answers about globaliza-
tion, we need experts. With this in mind, I am delighted that we are 
able this afternoon to welcome three leading experts in this field, 
all of whom will be giving us the benefit of their wisdom today. You 
will first be invited to listen to these three keynote speeches, whom I 
will introduce in a moment. After a short break, there will be a panel 
discussion chaired by my distinguished colleague, member of the 
Council and a professor at Utrecht University, Peter van Lieshout, 
who has the specific responsibility within the Council of leading the 
group that is preparing an advisory report on the future strategy of 
development policy (and which we hope to publish towards the end 
of next year). 
Dear guests; our first speaker, and I want to emphasize how hon-
oured we are to have her in our midst, is Nancy Birdsall. Dr. Birdsall 
is the president of the Washington-based Center for Global Develop-
ment. The Centre is a leading think-tank, which not only carries out 
a great deal of intellectual research, but which also produces practical 
ideas for global prosperity. We are very happy, Dr. Birdsall, that you 
have accepted our invitation to be here today, especially in these 
turbulent times. I have been told that you have lost some of your best 
people to the transitional team that is helping president-elect Barack 
Obama to develop new policies in fields such as development aid. 
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Dr. Birdsall will be speaking to us this afternoon about the political 
economy of market transitions, developing nations, aid-effective-
ness, capital flows and financial crisis. 
After Nancy Birdsall we will hear the Cambridge economist  
Dr. Ha-Joon Chang, originally from Korea. He is a well-known and 
highly successful author in the field of development aid. You may 
have read one of his thought-provoking books, ‘Kicking Away the 
Ladder’ or ‘Bad Samaritans’, in which he challenges some widely 
held but not, as it turns out, very productive ideas about develop-
ment aid. His main point will be that, historically speaking, neo-
 liberal policies have never made any country rich. This afternoon, he 
will focus on the role of the nation-state in a context of globalization. 
Dr. Chang was also a very influential member of the advisory panel 
for the human development report that was published in 1999. We 
are very pleased, Dr. Chang, to have you as our guest this afternoon 
and tomorrow, when you will be speaking at a small expert seminar 
being organised by the Council.
After we have heard these first two speakers we will take a short 
break . We will then listen to Dr. Herman Wijffels, who has just re-
tired as an executive director of the World Bank. As he told me a few 
weeks ago, it was the first time in his life, after 40 years, that he had 
been jobless. But, Herman, we are quite sure that you will continue 
to be involved in many of the key strategic questions facing Dutch 
society and even the world at large, in response to the many invita-
tions and responsibilities that will undoubtedly come your way. We 
are very proud and honoured that you have accepted our invitation 
to be our third speaker here this afternoon.
We are very happy to have you all here. So let me not dwell too long 
on this introduction, and immediately give the floor to our first 
speaker, Dr. Nancy Birdsall. 
Thank you very much.
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I am honored to speak to this distinguished audience in this impres-
sive setting. I am reminded being here that I think of the Netherlands 
as a key birthplace of the modern middle-class – captured so well by 
Vermeer and other painters of the late 16th century. The fate and role of 
the middle class is a theme that will recur in my remarks here today.
Reframing	the	traditional	development	agenda
We are in the midst of an extraordinary moment. On the one hand, 
in my country, there are enormously high expectations of a more 
pragmatic, active government calling on Americans’ shared inter-
est in a better world beyond as well as within our borders. On the 
other hand, we are all absorbing the grim new reality of a financial 
crisis born in America now escalating into a global economic disaster, 
threatening the well-being of people everywhere and, sadly, undoing 
the recent gains against the terrible poverty so many people suffer in 
emerging-market and low-income economies. 
I believe those of us in the development community need to seize 
this moment – and to make of the current crisis an opportunity for 
a major change in the way we think about the development agenda. 
Today I want to suggest that we reframe the conventionally defined 
development agenda as, in large part, the construction by an activist 
international community of a global social contract. A 21st century 
global social contract should be designed to maximize the benefits of 
global economic interdependence (or to use the popular term ‘global-
ization’) while minimizing the risks and costs not only for the world’s 
poor but for the world’s indispensable middle-class – both the large 
middle-class in the rich world’s mature democratic economies and 
the incipient middle-class in emerging markets and a few low-income 
countries.
the development agenda as a global social contract
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Defining development as construction of a global social contract sug-
gests two challenges for development advocates. First, it suggests a 
definition of development as a global imperative in which all nations 
and people have a common interest – rather than as a matter primar-
ily of aid as charity passed from rich to poor nations. Indeed, if the 
current crisis increases awareness on the part of the world’s rich and 
powerful (people and nation-states) of their dependence on prosper-
ity and security in emerging market and other developing economies, 
that would be the silver lining in today’s cloud of gloom over the 
sinking global economy since it could motivate citizens and voters 
in the rich world to pay more serious attention to their own interest 
in progress in the developing world. Second, it suggests putting high 
priority on strengthening the institutions that manage and protect 
our common interest by fostering growth and sustainable develop-
ment worldwide. In our global economy these institutions – includ-
ing the multilateral development banks, the World Bank, the United 
Nations agencies, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade 
Organization, the Basel Committee, and many more – constitute the 
global ‘polity’ we need to manage the investment, protection and 
other functions a robust global social contract implies. 
The	ongoing	crisis:	a	more	activist	state;	a	hyper-connected	
global	economy
I want to preface my discussion of these points with two observa-
tions about the current crisis that bear on my overall message. 
First, the ongoing crisis will not lead to a fundamental rejection 
of markets but to a redrawing of the line between the state and the 
market in the mature Western economies. On the one hand, what 
Churchill said about democracy is also true of market-driven econo-
mies: terrible until you consider the alternatives. On the other hand, 
there is little doubt that American-style capitalism is under siege. 
The state is resurgent, especially in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, where the era of Reagan and Thatcher had run its course 
anyway and is now decidedly over. In all the advanced economies, 
markets, particularly financial markets (the cowboy sector of Ameri-
can capitalism, which has in turn spread to Europe as well as it 
11
turns out), will be ‘fettered’, that is, more regulated. In the next few 
years, the views of my fellow speaker today, Ha-Joon Chang, will be 
far more influential than they have been as the balance of state and 
market in what are mixed economies shifts and a more activist state 
emerges in Europe, Japan, and America. 
One likely change in the balance will come in the form of an expand-
ed domestic social contract by which citizens contract with each other 
through the state to guarantee access to health, education and other 
public goods and protect against individual risks and the systemic 
risks that markets generate. This will be true especially in the United 
States, leading to a kind of convergence with Europe in the nature of 
the welfare state. Everywhere that democratic politics works reason-
ably well, the domestic social contract will be strengthened, especial-
ly to protect the middle class. In the United States, where the median 
wage has not risen in almost two decades and where ‘globalization’ 
has become the scapegoat of a stagnant median wage and failed health 
and other social insurance policies, it will otherwise be politically 
impossible to retain even begrudging support for open trade markets 
and minimal levels of legally sanctioned immigration. 
The only question is whether a strengthened domestic social contract 
will take the form of increased public spending on health, education, 
and public infrastructure and a shift in the tax burden toward the rich 
in order to reduce taxes on the middle class, or direct government 
subsidies to protect ‘middle-class’ jobs in domestic industries, with 
attendant risks to the current global trade regime. I hope it will be the 
former, but one way or another, implicitly or explicitly, governments 
in affluent democracies will be emphasizing increased support for 
their middle-class majorities.
The second observation is that the hyper-connectivity of the global 
market, including the reality of the rich world’s interdependence 
with the poor world, has been driven home. We have seen in the last 
couple of months a desperate effort at greater international coordina-
tion of macroeconomic and financial-sector policies because a failure 
of international coordination, as in the 1930s, risks turning a reces-
sion into a long and deep global depression. There are calls to eschew 
the development agenda as a global social contract
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beggar-thy-neighbor policies, both on the financial side (as when 
guaranteeing deposits in Ireland led to flight out of banks elsewhere) 
and in the real economy, to avoid (under the umbrella of “social” 
efforts to protect jobs) new trade and industrial protection programs 
(though by early December such programmes were already being 
actively discussed in Russia, France, and the United States). 
Perhaps most noteworthy, is that with the first-ever meeting last 
month of the heads of state of the G-20 (the G-7 plus 13 emerging 
markets including Brazil, Russia, India, China, Indonesia, South 
Africa, and others), we may have seen the beginning of the end of the 
increasingly irrelevant G-7 club of nations. The G-20 meeting came 
near the end of this year in which almost all of the paltry growth in 
the United States was due to exports – of which almost 40 per cent 
went to developing countries. In contrast to the past, this time it is 
the United States and to some extent Western Europe that bear re-
sponsibility – among other things due to their regulatory failures – for 
today’s economic losses throughout the world. And for the first time 
the rich countries are dependent on growth and effective countercy-
clical policy in China, Brazil, the Middle East, and elsewhere to help 
keep their own economies afloat next year; they cannot manage any 
recovery, for themselves or for others, alone. 
For today’s rich countries, there is potential tension between a more 
activist state, at the national level, more likely to intervene in sup-
port of home industries and jobs, and the demands on coordination 
of interdependence. Let us hope that in 2008-09, in contrast to the 
1930s, ‘activism’ takes a different form and the world’s richest and 
most powerful sovereign states will be able to subsume short-term 
domestic political interests to the general global welfare – if only be-
cause protecting global welfare is actually more consistent with their 
own overall long-term interests.
What do these two observations – a more activist sovereign state and 
continuing interdependence among sovereigns – have to do with the 
idea of a global social contract? The following: to save the hyper-
connected global economy from its excesses and to make it fair and 
politically sustainable, there is a need for some sort of ‘activist’ polity 
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at the global level analogous to the state at the domestic level. An ac-
tivist global polity is needed to construct and manage a contract at the 
global level analogous to the social contract at the domestic level that 
exists in one form or another in most mature democratic societies. 
On the one hand a global social contract sounds worryingly utopian. 
On the other hand, it is simply about adapting to the reality of a global 
market-driven economy – implying a convergence of global political 
necessity with the longstanding development agenda. 
In the remainder of this essay, I discuss further the logic of a ‘global’ 
social contract for rich nations, given their increasing interdependence 
with developing countries; describe the logic of a ‘social’ contract, 
given the shortcomings and risks of market-based globalization; and 
then set out briefly four actions rich countries should put on their de-
velopment agenda to build a durable and enforceable global contract. 
A	global	social	contract
Why global? Global interdependence
The rich world’s own security and material prosperity depend 
increasingly on shared growth and on stable and competent govern-
ments responding to their people’s demands and needs ‘out there’ in 
poor countries. One straightforward reason why this is true is that 
the relative size of the rich world economies and populations is de-
clining. Under reasonable assumptions about future growth rates, the 
combined economies of the bric's (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) 
will soon be larger than those of the G-7; they are simply likely to 
grow faster in the next several decades than rich countries, as their 
much lower per-capita incomes continue to converge slowly to those 
of the rich world. The middle-class in those and other emerging mar-
kets is likely to be twice the size of the entire population of the United 
States within the next 20 years. Three of the world’s five largest com-
panies by market capitalization are Chinese, and by some accounts 
four of the top ten richest people in the world are Indian nationals. As 
this century unfolds, it is in these fast-growing economies that rich-
world producers will find new markets and rich, new investment 
opportunities, and from them that will emerge the ideas, people, and 
innovations that will improve consumers lives everywhere. 
the development agenda as a global social contract
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At the same time, most developing countries, even geopolitically 
ascendant China and India, contend with widespread poverty and 
misery and the attendant social and political problems. In India, 
approximately 2 million children die before age five, and 21 million 
children of primary school age are not in school. Their new middle-
classes are weak and often disengaged politically except when their 
own parochial interests can be served. (Indeed, my own analysis of 
income distribution data for over 50 countries indicates that most 
developing countries have no more than 20 per cent of their popula-
tions in what I would define as the middle-class – living on at least 
$10 a day per person and below the income of the 95th percentile of 
the total population; what we think of as middle-class consumers in 
Egypt, India, Indonesia, and Peru are actually among the 5 per cent of 
richest households in their countries and thus not in the ‘middle’ at 
all.) A small middle-class cannot provide the ballast that undergirds 
responsible and effective government as in the rich-world economies, 
where the large middle-class supports the rule of law, respect for 
property rights and human rights, and access for all to education and 
economic opportunities. Growth without development in Pakistan 
and in Bolivia, Nigeria and other natural resource–based economies, 
and setbacks following a decade or more of growth in the Ivory Coast, 
Zimbabwe, and even Venezuela have been far more about local politi-
cal failures than economic ones. Even those low-income economies 
with responsible leadership – Ghana, Mali, Morocco – face daunting 
problems of management and capacity constraints that deeply under-
mine their well-intentioned efforts to reduce poverty
Yet the global community, including all of you and me, relies on com-
petent governments everywhere to play by certain rules in our global 
society. Incompetent and corrupt governments are weak links in the 
chain that provides global security and enables global prosperity. De-
forestation and the resulting climate risks in the Congo and Indone-
sia; avian flu incubated in Vietnam; consumer safety breakdowns in 
food and toy manufacturing in China; terrorist groups in the Philip-
pines and Pakistan – all these risks cannot be contained within the 
borders of the poor countries where they start. 
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From both the perspective of new opportunities out there, and of 
new cross-border risks, development matters. It is in the interests 
of rich countries to bind themselves in some contractual form to 
engagement with poor countries. 
Why social? Three market shortcomings
Market reform and outward-oriented economic policies are not to 
be disdained. They are a good part of the explanation for the rapid 
growth and huge reductions in poverty of the last two decades and 
more in China, India, Bangladesh, and Vietnam, just as they were 
earlier in the East Asian Tigers. In China, it was liberalization of 
agriculture that started the process; in China and in India since the 
late 1980s a more business-friendly environment and openness to 
foreign investment have contributed. In Latin America and Africa, 
good macroeconomic policies in the last two decades, helped along 
recently by the global commodity boom, have brought growth rates 
as high as six percent – and in the democracies of Africa seven to eight 
percent, finally bringing reductions not only in the rate of poverty but 
the absolute numbers of people living in poverty in many countries.
But I am no globophile. Markets as a mechanism for organizing 
societies have fundamental shortcomings, and the effects of these are 
easily intensified in the case of global markets. Let me mention three.
First, markets leave people and countries without the right assets 
behind. First, markets reward productive assets. They tend to lock in 
pre-existing income and wealth inequality or generate, along with 
growth, increasing inequality. 
For individual people, the right asset in today’s global economy is 
higher education (and the skills and flexibility that higher education 
signals and reinforces). Since the late 1980s, the salary premium to 
higher education has been rising virtually everywhere. Although the 
supply of graduates of higher education has been increasing almost 
everywhere in the world, the demand for their skills has increased 
even faster, fueled by rapid technological change (consider the influ-
ence alone of the World Wide Web) and the nearly instant diffusion 
of new technologies in globally connected markets. The demand for 
the development agenda as a global social contract
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highly skilled and talented people at the global level has set off intense 
competition among rich countries to institute immigration policies 
not just to permit but to encourage the entry of skilled workers – con-
tributing to the much higher emigration rates of skilled compared to 
unskilled people from developing countries. (New research suggests 
that the benefits of that emigration for sending countries probably ex-
ceed the costs; I mention it here as an indicator of the reality of a global 
market rewarding education, not necessarily as a problem in itself.)
For countries, the key asset appears to be stable and sound govern-
ment institutions committed to the rule of law, human rights, and 
property rights. An example of the wrong ‘asset’ for countries is a 
comparative advantage in production and export of primary com-
modities, whether agriculture or, especially for immature democ-
racies with minimal accountability to citizens, oil or other non-
renewable mineral resources. Countries that entered the 1980s highly 
dependent on commodity exports – whether Angola, Bolivia, Ghana, 
Malawi, Nicaragua, or Nigeria – and failed to diversify into manu-
facturing lost out on more than two decades of growth, in contrast 
to China, Malaysia, and (more recently) Vietnam. One plausible 
explanation is that entry into manufacturing (and now perhaps into 
IT services) encourages the accumulation of skills by increasing the 
returns to human capital, and the diffusion of innovations that fuel 
endogenous growth.) 
We entered the 1990s with pre-existing inequalities within countries 
in education and a dramatic gap between the competence and stabil-
ity of rich-country governments and that of the poorest countries. 
The differences in assets have helped ensure that income inequality 
has risen in the majority of developing countries enjoying at least 
some growth; and that between the initially richest and poorest 
countries the gap in average incomes has grown dramatically – essen-
tially because the poorest countries have grown little if at all while the 
richest have continued to move ahead. 
A second shortcoming of markets, particularly financial markets, 
is volatility. In 2008, we saw how the tightening of fuel and food 
markets led to price spikes that were particularly painful for importing 
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countries that had relied on global trade of these products. In the ab-
sence of any global arrangement or rules to make those markets more 
resilient and less volatile, it is not surprising to hear renewed calls for 
energy independence in the United States and food security in the 
Philippines and Indonesia, despite the efficiency losses and other costs 
that shifting from openness to real autarchy in these markets would 
imply. But of the triple whammy in food, fuel, and finance that poor 
countries suffered this past year, it is the financial one that will be the 
most costly and the best remembered, particularly in the emerging-
market economies that had opened their financial and capital markets. 
Financial crises hurt all countries, but developing countries have 
tended to suffer much greater relative losses in the past, losses of 10 
per cent of gdp and more compared to two to three percent in rich 
countries following banking crises. And within countries, the poor 
who lose jobs and income often sell assets or take their children out 
of school, implying permanently lower lifetime income. In Mexico 
many children who left school during the 1994-95 tequila crisis never 
returned.
The results are long-lasting for the relatively poor in other ways as 
well. One example: the high public debt that follows government 
rescues of banks and other financial institutions crowds out private 
investment and job creation and reduces the fiscal space for spending 
on infrastructure, education, and health programmes that benefit the 
poor the most and help build a middle-class. There is good evidence 
that the labor share of total income relative to capital declines during 
crises and never fully recovers. Thus volatility is complicit in contrib-
uting to income inequality.
A third shortcoming of markets is that they cannot and do not address 
‘public’ goods, i.e. products and services on which market actors can-
not make a profit (or fully capture the benefits were they to invest or 
spend). Basic education is publicly financed almost everywhere in the 
world because basic education is a quasi-public good – parents (and 
their children) can capture some of the benefits of going to school but 
not all the benefits that societies reap when more people are schooled. 
By the same logic, most governments spend public resources to pre-
the development agenda as a global social contract
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vent contagious diseases. The classic case of a public good is control 
of pollution: the factory owner who implements pollution controls 
pays the cost of control (in the absence of a subsidy) but captures only 
a small part of the benefits to his community. At the global level, the 
classic counterpart case is the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions: 
countries that commit resources to reduce emissions cannot capture 
all the benefits for themselves. Just as local pollution control requires 
that some government entity impose regulations or create offsetting 
incentives through taxes or subsidies, global-level control of green-
house gas emissions is likely to require that an activist international 
community (including at the least the major polluter countries) 
impose controls or agree on incentives. 
Climate change is another example of a global problem that hits the 
poor people and countries hardest. By an unfortunate twist of fate, 
tropical countries that contributed least to the accumulation of gas 
are likely to suffer the worst declines in agricultural productivity, 
in precisely the sector where the poor within countries are heavily 
concentrated. In the absence of corrective action at the global level, 
projected declines in agriculture in India are on the order of 30 per 
cent in the next 70 years – and as much or worse in parts of Africa. Sea 
level rise in Bangladesh, drought and floods, and the expanding reach 
of malaria and other diseases in many tropical areas will also hit those 
most vulnerable hardest. And even for the same risks, poorer people 
and poor countries have fewer resources with which to protect them-
selves and adjust to changes and will therefore suffer much higher 
welfare costs if not higher absolute costs from the effects of climate 
change.
Other global public goods that the market naturally neglects (in these 
cases a pecuniary market failure) include agricultural research and 
development likely to benefit people and places with low incomes 
and limited market power and health research and development on 
malaria and other diseases that primarily afflict the poor. These are 
areas where in the last several decades large philanthropies like the 
Gates Foundation have stepped in to compensate for chronic under-
funding by rich-country ‘donor’ governments.
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In short, in the absence of government intervention, markets alone 
are not a sufficient organizing principle for socially and politically 
stable societies. They tend to generate inequality, since alone they fa-
vor those who already have financial or human capital or other assets 
(such as political privileges or family connections); they fail to protect 
the poor and vulnerable during financial and other crises, and alone 
will not provide the pension, health and other social insurance needs 
that reduce insecurity among the middle-class (and invite reasonable 
risk-taking and innovation); and they naturally fail to provide for key 
public goods (due to what economists refer to as missing markets or 
market failures). 
Building	a	global	social	contract:	A	development	agenda
The conventional development agenda begins (and too often ends) 
with an emphasis on the quantity of aid. Let me suggest a four-part 
agenda for building and sustaining a robust global social contract, 
which includes but goes well beyond aid. 
First, as is the case within country borders, there should be a laser-
like focus on avoiding harm to any members of the global commu-
nity. An apt example is the imperative, from a development point 
of view, that rich countries during this global economic crisis do not 
yield to the protectionist pressures that were so calamitous in the 
1930s for the then ‘world’ economy. I am optimistic they will not 
– perhaps with leadership from here in the Netherlands, since you 
are a small sea-going economy that has mastered and is dependent on 
global trading opportunities. 
Doing no harm also requires changing some current rich-country 
policies and programmes. The Common Agricultural Policy, which 
ends up hurting developing country agricultural producers, is an ob-
vious example in Europe – as are cotton, sugar, and other forms of ag-
ricultural protection in the United States. The subsidy and protection 
for corn-based biofuel in the United States is discouraging invest-
ment in biofuels in which developing countries have or could have a 
comparative advantage. The wto-agreed intellectual property rights 
regime reflects a tradeoff between access and innovation pushed by 
the development agenda as a global social contract
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the United States and others in the 1990s that is inappropriate for the 
world’s poorest countries – where the premium has to be on access, 
particularly to new medicines; Ha-Joon Chang discusses this prob-
lem in more detail in his remarks. And then there is the tough issue of 
migration. A colleague of mine at the Center for Global Development 
argues that emigration is development. Certainly for the unskilled, 
emigration from a poor country to a rich country is the single easiest 
and most effective escape from poverty. Nigerian, Haitian, and Hon-
duran construction workers and taxi drivers with little education can 
instantly increase their incomes fivefold and more by simply moving 
from their home to a rich country. Immigration is a difficult domestic 
political issue in all countries – rich and poor – and it would be naïve 
to expect all countries to liberalize this market as they have liberal-
ized trade and capital markets. But development advocates could be 
more assertive in calling for easing of current illiberal restrictions on 
the movement of people across borders, given the growing evidence 
of the benefits of such movements for both sending and receiving 
countries. 
The idea of do no harm extends as well to enforcing anti-corruption 
rules on investors abroad and supporting actively the Extractive In-
dustries Transparency Initiative, the Equator Principles, the Kimberly 
process, and other efforts to bind private and public agents to good 
behavior in their dealings with developing countries. Cooperating 
on programs to document and fight illegitimate and illegal tax and 
capital flight also falls into this category.
Second, again as is the case within country borders, all governments 
should allocate more resources to global public goods by spending 
both at home and abroad. As happens within countries, there should 
be some redistribution through taxes and expenditures of the burden 
and benefits of such spending from rich to poor – in this case across 
countries – in the enlightened self-interest of the rich. A good exam-
ple is investments in clean energy technologies to minimize climate 
change, including spending within rich countries on energy research 
and development. Naturally there is concern that rich governments 
will divert resources from traditional aid programmes to ‘global’ 
programmes; but, in fact, recent evidence suggests that the effects of 
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climate change are already imposing high welfare costs on the world’s 
poor, so whatever tradeoff there may be is far less clear than hereto-
fore assumed. Ideally in the context of a climate change treaty, the 
much greater per-capita emissions of rich countries compared to poor 
will imply major compensatory financial transfers from the former to 
the latter to purchase emissions rights. Those transfers would not be 
aid, with its administrative and proto-paternalistic burdens on poor 
countries, but legally based transactions in which all parties honor 
contractual obligations. In any event, r&d on clean energy would 
ideally include a major focus on sun, wind, and biofuel technologies 
that would tap the comparative advantage of developing countries, 
many of which literally have more sun than rich countries, and would 
be compatible with the needs of low-income and rural populations.
Other global public goods include public investment in new and im-
proved medicines and health delivery technologies and in agriculture 
(for example to create a Green Revolution in Africa and elsewhere) 
oriented to the needs of people in developing countries, and public 
contractual commitments to finance successful development and 
deployment of such technologies by the private sector. 
Whether called “aid” (or better not – Jean-Michel Severino who 
heads the Agence Francaise de Developpement with his co-author 
Olivier Ray suggests the term “global public finance” in a recent 
paper), rich countries should develop and agree on clear norms and 
agreed financing mechanisms (the European Union aviation tax is 
an apt example) for the allocation of resources to global public goods 
relevant for poor countries and poor people.
Third, donor countries should focus on the quality and at the least 
maintain the current quantity of traditional aid. In domestic social 
contracts, some transfers (publicly financed education) are meant to 
support future growth by maximizing society’s investment in human 
capital and to level the playing field in ensuring access to health and 
education; some transfers (public subsidies and provisions for old age 
and health insurance) provide social insurance across the board for all 
income groups; some transfers (welfare payments to the indigent and 
unemployable) are primarily humanitarian in the interests of social 
the development agenda as a global social contract
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solidarity. It is not always easy or useful to draw clear lines around 
these three purposes. As with domestic transfers, so with foreign aid: 
it is not always easy or useful to distinguish between aid for “growth” 
and aid in the interest of global solidarity. The Millennium Develop-
ment Goals obviously address both growth and solidarity objectives; 
budget support provides for both; infrastructure investments and ag-
riculture are usually viewed as mostly about long-term growth. The 
bottom line is that aid can be framed as the counterpart of domestic 
public spending on health, education, credit programmes for small 
businesses and so on – which, as with domestic spending, has mul-
tiple purposes. It compensates for the shortcomings of markets set 
out above, both in the political interest of retaining the benefits of an 
open, global economy for all and in response to the solidarity impulse 
in an increasingly interlinked world on which the rich world. The 
striking difference of course is in the amounts spent – on the global 
social contract by rich countries less than one per cent of gdp, while 
on the domestic counterpart upwards of 20 per cent.
The shadow of a ‘contract’ exists at the global level in the form of the 
commitment of the traditional donor countries to spend at least 0.7 
per cent of their own gpd on aid – but of course (as amply dem-
onstrated at the un Doha Conference last month on financing for 
development) it is in fact only the shadow of a contract. In the face of 
political resistance to increasing aid in the next year, donor agencies 
would be smart to focus on getting better results for resources they 
already commit − in ways that would create accountability of recipi-
ent governments to their own citizens, rather than to donors. At the 
Center for Global Development, we have suggested one practical in-
novation toward that end (we call it cash-on-delivery aid), and there 
are others worth trying and systematically evaluating. Donors could 
easily and instantly move on far greater transparency of their alloca-
tions and expenditures, and all could increase the proportion of their 
aid that goes through multilateral institutions as one way to mini-
mize recipient governments’ transactions and administrative costs. 
Fourth, and perhaps most fundamental, is the tougher issue of 
creating an effective global polity to manage a global social contract. 
The global economy has far outstripped the institutions and clubs 
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of nations that make up the global polity. In effect the economics of 
globalization has run far ahead of the politics of globalization. At the 
international level we have only the faintest shadow of the equivalent 
of the activist state at the national level – to fetter or manage a global 
economy or to provide the protection against its ravages for vulner-
able global citizens concentrated in developing countries. What we 
do have is a hodgepodge of official and quasi-official institutions in 
which various combinations of nations make up the membership (the 
un and its 20-odd separate agencies, the imf, the wto, the multi-
lateral banks, the Bank for International Settlements, the club-like 
groups of nations (G-7, G-20, G-77, G-24). But in contrast to the 
sovereign state, this international polity is relatively weak and inef-
fective. In contrast to the democratic legitimacy of most states, this 
polity lacks legitimacy. As a result, in contrast to the condition of the 
domestic social contract in the world’s mature Western economies, 
the global social contract for which this international polity is respon-
sible is fragile indeed.
Yet the interdependence among nations illustrated by today’s 
financial and economic crisis highlights the need for a more ‘activ-
ist’ international polity – not with the power of sovereign states but 
certainly with more resources and responsibilities than it has today. 
In the near term, an activist international polity is needed not only 
for the coordination of a timely global fiscal stimulus and agreement 
on regulation of global financial markets – but also to agree on some 
minimal levels of protection (without protectionist trade and other 
policies) against the downside for vulnerable global citizens every-
where. Beyond today’s crisis, ensuring that the global market works 
better for the poor and middle as well as the rich – in some imitation 
at the global level of the domestic social contract – seems critical to 
the political sustainability of market-based globalization. 
 
So I would put high on the development agenda the need to move 
beyond ad hoc bilateral arrangements between rich and poor coun-
tries in two ways. First is the strengthening of the international 
institutions where the solidarity norms and the global equivalent of 
taxes and subsidies and regulations for the global polity need to be 
embedded. In the case of the development agenda, these include most 
the development agenda as a global social contract
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obviously the imf, the multilateral banks, and the United Nations 
– but also the wto, the Basel Committee and so on. Second, for the 
financial institutions, is the reform of their governance to make them 
more representative and therefore more credible and effective in 
developing countries; I and others have written extensively on this 
issue. It is not surprising that the global trade, intellectual property 
migration and other regimes reflect the greater market (and military) 
power of rich countries; and that on such difficult issues as immi-
gration that the domestic political constraints within rich countries 
tend to trump the needs of world’s poor. That does not mean that for 
solidarity reasons, and to politically sustain a global market system, 
with all its benefits, the development community should stand aside 
and accept the hand dealt. On the contrary, it means there is logic in 
constant vigilance or readiness as global citizens to swim against the 
tide of market and political power at the global level, just as we do as 
responsible citizens within each of our countries – in the interests of a 
better world for all. 
In	conclusion:	Restating	two	points	about	the	global	social	
contract
A global market-based economy has tremendous potential benefits 
for improving lives by generating and allocating resources well – but 
only if it is complemented by a robust global social contract through 
which rich and poor nations bind each other to commitments in the 
interest of the common global good. In conclusion, I would like to 
restate two points about this global contract. 
First, it provides a way for the development community to think 
differently about aid and to think beyond aid. Aid as part of a social 
contract across nations and peoples can be thought of not only in its 
traditional form of investment in people, infrastructure, and better 
government, likely to raise economic growth over the medium term, 
but also in the form of solidarity or redistributive transfers to protect 
and improve the welfare of unlucky fellow global citizens today. Fur-
thermore, aid is only one mechanism by which rich and poor nations 
interact. Beyond aid are trade, migration, investment, climate change, 
and other policies of rich nations by which they directly or indirectly 
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affect poor nations and which should be shaped to promote develop-
ment and the common global interest. 
Second, management of a robust global social contract requires 
a strong and effective global ‘polity’ to provide opportunities for 
the unlucky, protect the vulnerable, and bind us all to agreed rules 
and commitments through and by which those opportunities and 
protections are guaranteed. Development advocates in this 21st cen-
tury setting of global hyper-connectivity ought to put considerable 
priority on strengthening the institutions that make up our current 
global polity. A key aspect of their strengthening is to make them 
more representative and legitimate; without greater representation 
of developing countries, both small and poor and large and geopoliti-
cally ascendant, we put at risk the political and social sustainability of 
the market-based global economy itself. It is in the end through these 
institutions that the habits and norms, as well as the rules of a global 
social contract, are most likely to be shaped in a way that will put 
global markets and globalization to work for the majority of people 
everywhere.
the development agenda as a global social contract
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The progress of globalization – or more precisely neo-liberal globaliza-
tion, for globalization can take different forms – since the 1980s has 
been impressive. Cross-border flows of ideas, people, goods, services, 
and especially capital have increased dramatically. However, its socio-
economic outcomes have been, to put it mildly, less than impressive.
To begin with, neo-liberal globalization has increased inequality in 
most societies, often dramatically. When confronted with this point, 
proponents of neo-liberal globalization argue that we have to create 
wealth before we can redistribute it. I agree with this argument, but 
the question is whether neo-liberal globalization has been good at 
creating wealth.
Neo-liberals love to tell us that “we are richer than ever, thanks to 
globalization”. However, this is a mathematical triviality turned into 
a clever advertising slogan. We will always be ‘richer than ever’, as 
long as the world economy does not shrink for a prolonged period. 
The real question is whether, under a different regime, we could have 
been ‘even richer’, and the answer to that is ‘yes’.
During the neo-liberal period, the growth of the world economy 
has actually decelerated, not accelerated, compared to the ‘bad old 
days’ of greater protectionism and interventionism in the 1960s and 
70s. The world economy grew at around three per cent a year dur-
ing the 1960s and the 1970s, while it has struggled to grow at two 
per cent per annum in the last quarter of a century of neo-liberalism 
(and let us not forget that quite a lot of that growth has been due to 
the explosive growth of China and, to a lesser extent, India – two 
countries that, while gradually liberalizing and opening up, have not 
really followed the neo-liberal path). The growth performance of 
neo-liberal globalization will look even worse when the current crisis 
ends, although it is not possible to say by how much, as we cannot yet 
predict the depth and the duration of this crisis.
globalization and the role of the state
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Growth deceleration has been particularly severe in developing 
regions like Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, which for various 
reasons have implemented neo-liberal policies more thoroughly than 
other regions. In the ‘bad old days’ of the 1960s and the 70s, per capita 
income in Latin America grew at an impressive 3.1 per cent per year. 
In the ‘brave new world’ (1980-2004), it has been growing at a paltry 
0.5 per cent. Even if we leave out the 1980s as the decade of adjust-
ment when the effects of the ‘bad’ policies in the previous periods 
were still being felt, the annual growth rate is only about 1.3 per cent. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, per capita income grew at 1.6 percent a year 
even during the ‘bad old days’ of 1960-80, but since then the region 
has seen a fall in living standards (by 0.3 % a year). 
Slower growth also came with greater instability, produced by un-
controlled financial liberalization and opening up. Neo-liberals may 
argue that economies have become more stable in the neo-liberal 
period because the rate of inflation has fallen. However, on a broader 
measure of economic stability that takes into account stability of 
output and employment, and not just prices, the neo-liberal period 
has a terrible record. Starting with the 1982 Third World Debt Crisis, 
we have seen so many financial and economic crises caused by neo-
liberal financial deregulation and monetarist macroeconomic policies 
that it is difficult to remember them all – the Scandinavian crisis and 
the us Savings & Loans crisis in the late 1980s, the bursting of the 
Japanese bubble in the mid-1990s, the Mexican crisis of 1995, the 
1997 Asian crisis that affected several countries (Thailand, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Hong Kong, Korea and the Philippines), the 1998 Russian 
and Brazilian crises, the bursting of the dot.com bubble in the early 
2000s, the Argentine crisis of 2002, and today’s world financial crisis, 
to name just some of the most prominent examples.
Actually, greater instability and lower growth are related, because 
major negative shocks have negative impacts on long-term growth, 
through the irreversible destruction of productive capabilities at the 
individual company level (e.g. skills, organizational routines) as well 
as the stunting of individual development (e.g. disruption in health 
care and education for children). The negative growth effects of eco-
nomic instability are likely to be much greater in developing coun-
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tries, where productive capabilities are less well established and thus 
more vulnerable to shocks, and where there are many more individu-
als who are so close to the subsistence level that even a minor shock 
can stunt the development of many of them.
Despite the mounting evidence that neo-liberal globalization is 
not working, neo-liberals argue that trying to regulate – or worse, 
reverse – the current process of globalization through more public 
intervention would be like trying to turn back the clock. They argue 
that globalization is happening because of the rapid developments 
in transportation and communications technologies, and that those 
who want to slow or reverse it are the modern Luddites, the 19th 
century British textile workers who thought they could get their jobs 
back by destroying the machines that had replaced them.
However, this is a fundamentally mistaken and misleading view. 
The best way to show this is to go back a century, to the period of 
‘first globalization’. As has been well documented by many economic 
historians, the world economy in the late 19th and early 20th century 
was almost as globalized as it is today. The interesting thing is that 
this earlier globalization was achieved on the basis of rather primitive 
transportation and communications technologies – the steamship 
and wired – not even wireless – telegraphy. In contrast, the degree of 
globalization between the 1950s and the 1970s was much lower than 
in either period of high globalization, despite the fact that by then we 
had basically all the communications and transportation technologies 
that we have today, except for the Internet, albeit in somewhat less 
efficient forms. So if the world economy during this period was not 
very globalized, it was not because of the lack of technologies; it was 
because during that period there was a general consensus at national 
and international level that cross-border economic activities need to 
be carefully regulated. This comparison shows that it is not techno-
logical development that is driving globalization. Technologies only 
define the outer boundaries of the realm of possibilities, and it is ul-
timately politics that determine exactly where we end up within that 
realm, which is a pretty big place. The recent episode of globalization 
has progressed in the way it has only because the powerful countries 
have decided to rewrite the rules of the global economy in a particular 
globalization and the role of the state
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way. They have deregulated and opened up their own economies. 
More importantly, they have put far more pressure than before on 
the developing countries to do the same (but much more thoroughly) 
through their aid budgets, their influence on the imf and the World 
Bank, and their enormously superior power to set the agenda and to 
engage in negotiations in the wto and other trade talks.
Arguing that the real driver of globalization is politics, not technol-
ogy, is not to say that globalization is therefore something that can be 
reversed at will. Once changes are made to global rules and national 
policies regarding international interactions, they become difficult 
to change, not least because vested interests grow up around the new 
rules and practices. We are currently witnessing this in the reluctance 
of the major government to radically overhaul the global financial 
system, despite the huge economic crisis that it has brought about. 
However, even if we acknowledge the practical limits to reversing 
globalization, recognising its political origins at least allows us to 
dispense with the notion that nothing can be done to change what is 
going on.
If globalization is a politically modifiable process, the role of the state 
becomes crucial, for state action (mostly by the states of the rich 
countries) is what has driven the process. Actions by the nation-state 
have also been the most important ways in which societies have dealt 
with the negative consequences of globalization. Of course, this is not 
to say that other actors can be ignored – individual consumers, con-
sumer groups, trade unions, cooperatives, corporations, civil-society 
groups, international organizations, and so on. However, nation-
states remain the most important actors in shaping human destiny, 
despite the neo-liberal contention that now we live in a ‘borderless 
world’ in which the nation-state does not matter any more or, worse, 
has become an obstacle to human material progress. 
One simple example to show the enormous power that the nation-
state still has is to ask why a bus driver in The Hague gets paid dozens 
of more times than a bus driver in Delhi. Is it because the Dutch driv-
er is a more skilled driver, with higher productivity? No. If anything, 
the Indian driver is the more skilled one; when driving in Delhi, the 
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Indian bus driver is practically negotiating an obstacle course – he 
has to negotiate not only cars that do not keep to traffic rules but also 
cows, rickshaws, bicycles pulling a huge stack of crates behind them, 
pedestrians jumping traffic lights, children playing on the street, you 
name it. The Dutch bus driver in The Hague does not have to worry 
about such things, unless he is really having a bad day. So it is not the 
difference in their driving skills that determines the huge difference 
in wages between the Indian bus driver and the Dutch bus driver. It 
is, for the most part, the strict regulation on the international move-
ment of labour, imposed by the richer nation-states. 
Another example showing the importance of the nation-state, at the 
other end of the social spectrum, are the massive bail-outs of financial 
and industrial firms that have been implemented by the governments 
of the rich countries in the current crisis. Companies that were busy 
denouncing their national roots and criticising the nation-states 
for their counter-productive taxes and regulations have turned to 
those very same nation-states for rescue through those very tax and 
regulatory powers. This episode has revealed how the arguments 
declaring the demise of the nation-state are , at best, based on a poor 
understanding or, at worst, are a self-serving argument for corporate 
interests. 
Now, how should we think of the role of the state in relation to glo-
balization? It may be useful to think about this at two levels. First, we 
should think about the ways in which globalization is affecting the 
role of the state in individual countries, taking the current interna-
tional distribution of economic power, the current global rules of 
economic engagement, and the current global governance system as 
given. Second, we need to discuss how the global governance system 
may be reformed and the global rules rewritten, given the unsatisfac-
tory nature of neo-liberal globalization.
First, let us think about the role of the national state in the age of glo-
balization. Globalization has made national economic management 
more difficult in a number of ways. First of all, the problems that 
states need to solve have become more demanding. More open trade, 
while creating opportunities for some and sometimes even making 
globalization and the role of the state
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the national economy as a whole better off, has made countries more 
vulnerable to external shocks by making them more specialized. For 
example, the recent food crises in developing countries have shown 
the dangers of excessive trade specialization away from basic things 
for countries at lower levels of development. More importantly, more 
open capital markets have increased the power of capital, especially 
finance capital, enormously, thereby forcing countries to adopt poli-
cies that maximize the short-term financial returns of the ‘rentiers’ 
above everything, even when in the long run they hurt investment 
and growth as well as employment and equality – represented by the 
practice of ‘downsizing’.
Second, if the problems that nation-states face have become bigger, 
their capacities to solve them have been diminished, especially in 
the developing countries. The rewriting of global rules has made the 
use of many ‘standard’ economic policy tools much more difficult, 
if not impossible. For example, the wto has banned import quotas 
and export subsidies, despite the fact that they have been impor-
tant tools of industrial policy throughout history. The regulation of 
foreign investment, the use of tariffs and the use of subsidies have 
also become far more constrained under the wto, further reducing 
the policy options available. In the case of developing countries, even 
where some policies are allowed under formal global rules (such as 
the wto rules), many of them cannot be applied in practice, because 
they go against conditionalities imposed by the rich countries that are 
giving aid to them and the Bretton Woods institutions from which 
they borrow. Of course, in the case of imf/World Bank programmes, 
the developing countries can in theory reverse their policies once 
the programmes finish, but in practice reversing liberalization in an 
environment of global neo-liberal financial, political, and intellectual 
dominance takes a huge amount of intellectual independence and 
political courage that the leaders of these countries usually do not 
possess.
Having said all this, I would like to emphasise that, serious though 
they may be, neither the difficulties of national economic manage-
ment posed by globalization nor the reduction in policy freedom 
due to the rewriting of the global rules should be exaggerated. The 
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‘corrosive’ power of globalization on the autonomy of nation-states 
has not been as serious as it is believed to be. The best evidence for 
this is that, despite the widespread prediction that generous welfare 
states of the European kind will not survive global competition in 
the highly open economies of Europe, the European economies have 
basically maintained their commitments to the welfare state. This 
shows that policies that countries really want to maintain can be 
sustained even in the face of globalization. I would go a step further 
and argue that the ability of the European economies to remain open 
is critically dependent on their ability to maintain a good welfare state 
that protects people from shocks and helps them ‘re-tool’ themselves 
with new skills, but that is another story.
In terms of the limitations on the actions of nation-states imposed 
by the new global rules, it is not as if these rules prohibit all policy 
intervention. The rich countries in particular still have a lot of policy 
freedom, not least because they have made sure that the tools of in-
tervention that they need the most are allowed under the new global 
rules – agricultural subsidies, subsidies for r&d, subsidies to reduce 
regional inequality, anti-dumping provisions. Policy freedom has 
been considerably reduced for developing countries, but larger de-
veloping countries with international political clout – such as China, 
India, Brazil and South Africa – have the economic leverage and 
political confidence to utilise the formally available policy space to 
the maximum. Even some smaller, weaker developing countries have 
some room for manoeuvre and have successfully used policies that 
go against the orthodoxy, despite external pressures. For example, 
after their 2002 financial crises, Argentina and Uruguay abandoned 
orthodox policies and have done well. In another example, Malawi 
reintroduced fertiliser subsidies against World Bank advice but its ag-
riculture has done very well since then, forcing even the World Bank 
to re-examine its policy on fertiliser subsidies.
When told that globalization has reduced the room for manoeuvre 
for nation-states, the proponents of neo-liberal globalization respond 
that this is actually a good thing. Globalization imposes ‘discipline’ 
on wayward countries to stick to ‘good’ policies. If some national 
political autonomy is sacrificed in the process, they say, so be it. How-
globalization and the role of the state
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ever, as I have been arguing, the neo-liberal policies have not been 
‘good’. The financial mess that we are seeing today in the heartlands 
of neo-liberal capitalism, such as the us and Britain, is an eloquent 
testimony to this. As I mentioned earlier, for developing countries 
especially, the kind of open, deregulated capitalism that has been pro-
moted by the proponents of neo-liberal globalization has produced 
very poor results in terms of growth, stability and equality. Indeed, 
the history of capitalism shows that there is hardly any country that 
has become rich without violating at least some aspects of neo-liberal 
orthodoxy. 
All of today’s rich countries, except for the Netherlands and (pre-wwi) 
Switzerland employed protectionism for lengthy periods. Even these 
two countries did not fully conform to free-market orthodoxy, in 
that they refused to protect patents until 1912 and 1907, respectively.1 
Despite their pretence that they more or less invented free trade, Britain 
and the us were among the most protectionist economies in the world 
for long periods in their respective catch-up phases (from the 1720s to 
the 1850s in the case of Britain; from the 1830s to the 1940s in the case 
of the us) . The us heavily regulated fdi (foreign direct investment) in 
finance, shipping, mining and logging in the 19th century − especially 
in banking, where only American citizens could become directors in a 
national (as opposed to state) bank and foreign shareholders were not 
allowed to vote at agms. Between the 1930s and the 1980s, Finland 
officially classified all companies with more than 20 per cent foreign 
ownership as ‘dangerous enterprises’. The soe (state-owned enter-
prise) sector produces 22 per cent of gpd in Singapore and 16 per cent in 
Taiwan. And so on. Further details can be found in my books, Kicking 
Away the Ladder and Bad Samaritans, but the point is that, historically, 
neo-liberal policies have never made any country rich.
This brings us to our second point, that is, how we can reform the 
global system so that we allow, if not necessarily encourage, countries 
to adopt policies that are appropriate given their goals and needs. I 
have neither the space nor the intention to spell out here the details 
of how I think the global economic system needs to be reformed, so I 
will state only the main principles that I think we need to employ in 
reforming the global economic system so that all countries, not just 
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the economically strong and the politically powerful, can benefit. 
But before doing so , let me state one meta-principle that I think we 
should keep to – the principle that we need to maximize the diversity 
of approaches that are permitted. 
During the neo-liberal period there has been great pressure on de-
veloping countries to implement a set of ‘good’ policies and institu-
tions that suit the neo-liberal ideal. Of course, this ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach has been subject to severe criticisms and as a result the neo-
liberals now routinely pay lip-service to their respect for diversity 
and programme ‘ownership’ by the developing countries. How-
ever, the notion of diversity they have is what I call the Henry Ford 
principle of diversity – when asked whether he would stop insisting 
on painting all his Model-T cars black, he famously quipped: “Any 
customer can have a car painted any colour that he wants so long as 
it is black”. Despite their talk of diversity, the range of local variation 
that the neo-liberal orthodoxy is willing to accept is very narrow. Let 
me illustrate this point.
Will the neo-liberals, who have typically advocated inflation rates 
of one to three percent, be willing to accept a 20 per cent inflation 
rate for a 20-year period? Will they, despite the hopes they pin on 
fdi, be comfortable with a country virtually banning fdi? Can they, 
so convinced as they are of the superiority of private ownership, 
stomach a country with a public sector producing around 20 per cent 
of gdp? I don’t think so, but these ‘outrageous’ cases are all examples 
from real success stories – South Korea’s with an inflation rate of 
around eighteen per cent in the 1960s and 70s, Japan and Finland 
virtually banning fdi between the 1930s and the 1980s, and Taiwan’s 
and Singapore’s soe sectors producing sixteen per cent and 22 per 
cent, respectively, of gdp. These examples suggest that there is an 
enormous range of policy combinations that can produce success and 
therefore that the drive towards uniform (or very narrow ranges of) 
policies and institutions that the neo-liberal orthodoxy have been 
pushing in the last quarter of a century needs to be abandoned, if we 
are to design a desirable global economic system.
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Having made the case for the meta-principle of diversity, let me 
state three principles that I think we should apply in thinking about 
reforming the global system. First, the global rules should be changed 
to allow countries to pursue policies that are geared more towards 
long-term productive development. Trade rules should be redesigned 
to encourage upgrading by developing countries, rather than encour-
aging them to follow their comparative advantages and therefore sus-
tain their current production structure. More importantly, the finan-
cial architecture, both at the national and the global levels, should be 
redesigned so that there is more room for countries and their corpora-
tions to pursue long-term productive development. In practice this 
means encouraging developing countries not to open up their capital 
markets, severely restricting the flows of short-term financial capital, 
banning or heavily regulating derivatives, and regulating M&A in a 
way that is more compatible with productive development. Nokia is 
an example that illustrates perfectly the importance of these policies 
– its electronics subsidiary, which now is considered one of the great-
est companies in human history, was able to become what it is today 
only because the closed and tightly regulated financial market allowed 
the Nokia group to cross-subsidize it for a staggering seventeen years 
(1960-77), when it did not make a single penny of profit. 
Second, the global rules should be changed to promote counter-
 cyclical policies. For example, the notoriously pro-cyclical bis capital 
adequacy standard should be changed. For another example, the imf 
should stop telling developing countries in financial crisis to cut their 
public expenditure and to raise interest rates to usurious levels (for 
example, during the 1997-8 financial crises, Korea and Indonesia were 
forced to raise interest rates to 30 per cent and 80 per cent, respective-
ly). While we are witnessing it in the most dramatic manner today, 
since at least the 1930s the rich countries have been willing to main-
tain aggregate demand by running budget deficits and cutting interest 
rates whenever they experienced economic downturns. My advocacy 
of counter-cyclical policies is not simply for the sake of smoothing 
the business cycle, so to speak. It is also because negative shocks 
have irreversible long-term negative effects on long-term growth by 
destroying activity-specific physical capital, skills and organizational 
routines.
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Third, the global rules should be changed to allow ‘asymmetric’ 
interaction between countries with differential goals and abilities. 
For example, the richer countries should be more open in terms of 
international trade, because the poorer countries need more protec-
tion as they need to develop their infant industries and as they also 
have lower adjustment capabilities. Rich countries object to such sug-
gestions, invoking the notion of the ‘level playing field’. However, the 
level playing field is the wrong principle to apply when the players 
are unequal. When one team in a football game is, say, the Brazilian 
national team and the other team is made up of my thirteen-year-old 
daughter Yuna’s friends, it is only fair that the girls are allowed to 
attack downhill. In this case, a tilted, rather than a level playing field 
is the way to ensure fair competition. If you think this is an extreme 
example, you should recall that in sports like boxing, wrestling, and 
weightlifting we have weight classes, while golf has the handicap 
system. And the definitions of ‘equal players’ in these sports are 
very stringent. For example, in boxing, the lighter weight classes are 
literally within two or three-pound (1-1.5-kilo) bands. How is it that 
we think a boxing match between people with more than a couple 
of kilos’ difference in weights is so unfair that we structurally ban 
such competition, yet we accept that the usa and Honduras should 
compete on equal terms? 
Even when they agree with it, some people express scepticism about 
my proposal for asymmetric protection because they believe it is not 
in the interests of the rich countries to adopt such a regime. How-
ever, what I am advocating is not self-sacrifice on the part of the rich 
countries, but rather enlightened self-interest. If they are allowed to 
use policies that suit them better, developing countries are going to 
grow faster and provide a much bigger market for the rich countries 
in the long run. China is the best example to illustrate this point. 
Judging from the way the poorer former Soviet republics have been 
struggling since the transition, it is certain that China would not 
have grown very much had it gone for a ‘big bang’ type of neo-liberal 
reform. In reality, its gradualist reform path since 1978 has allowed its 
economy to become ten times bigger than it was then, and today the 
rich countries have a market to exploit that is ten times bigger than it 
used to be.
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To sum up, globalization has made it more difficult for the state to 
manage the national economy. At the same time, it has reduced its 
ability to do so. These changes, although they should not be exag-
gerated, need to be taken into account when formulating national 
policies. However, this should not lead us to conclude that neo-lib-
eral globalization should be unquestioningly accepted and that the 
nation-states should give up influencing their national economies. 
Globalization is largely driven by politics rather than technology, and 
can therefore be reshaped by deliberate decisions, especially by the 
rich countries. Especially given that neo-liberal globalisation has pro-
duced very poor results over the last 20-25 years, there is an urgent 
need to redesign the global rules so that national policies can become 
more oriented towards the long term, counter-cyclical and asymmet-
ric between rich and poor countries.
What does all this mean for the development policy of the Nether-
lands? I believe that the Netherlands has some unique characteristics 
that will allow it to play a critical role in rethinking globalization and 
economic development along the lines I have suggested.
First of all, the Netherlands has a tradition of defying the convention. 
In the 19th and early 20th century, when most other rich countries 
were engaged in protectionism of one form or another, the Nether-
lands stuck to free trade. It abolished its patent law in 1869, precisely 
when other countries were busy strengthening theirs. Despite having 
very little land and thus having no obvious (absolute or comparative) 
advantage in agriculture, it has developed its agricultural industry to 
the extent that it is the world’s third largest exporter of agricultural 
products.2 The Netherlands should live up to this tradition and take 
a leading role in questioning the conventional wisdom regarding 
globalization and economic development.
Second, in the post-World War II period, the Netherlands has built 
a reputation of being an independent and relatively impartial actor 
in global politics. This gives it a unique position in playing the role 
of an honest broker, facilitating a new global debate on the future of 
globalization and economic development.
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Lastly, and on a lighter note, the Dutch are officially the tallest people 
in the world, and therefore should be able to take a more far-sighted 
view in the thinking about globalization and economic development. 
globalization and the role of the state
0
sav i ng globa l iz at ion from i ts cheer l e a der s
notes
1 The Dutch case is actually more complex than this. The Netherlands had introduced a 
patent law in 1817 but abolished it in 1869, partly because its patent law was considered 
deficient even by the standards of the time, but mainly because the country thought that 
patent law, which creates artificial monopolies, was incompatible with the free trade prin-
ciples to which the country was committed at the time.
2 At 395 persons per sq. km, the Netherlands has the fifth highest population density in 
the world, excluding city states and small island states with territories smaller than, and 
including, that of Hong Kong (1,099 sq. km). Only Bangladesh (1,045 persons per sq. km), 
Taiwan (636 persons per sq. km), Mauritius (610 persons per sq. km) and South Korea (498 
persons per sq. km) have higher population densities. This is not counting the Palestin-
ian territories (6,020 sq. km and a population density of 667 per sq. km) and Puerto Rico 
(8,875 sq. km and a population density of 446 per sq. km), which are not fully indepen-




Dr. Herman Wijffels 
Ladies and gentlemen,
This is an excellent opportunity to discharge some of my experiences 
and related thinking of the last couple of years. I am also pleased to be 
part of this very distinguished panel. I will try to reflect on some of 
the points the previous speakers made. I would like to start with fully 
embracing Nancy. That is to say, Nancy’s proposal for a global social 
contract, because I think that is a very good way to state what we 
need in the world going forward. So let me explain. I will do that from 
my own perspective and in my own way of reasoning. My view is also 
based on what I have seen and learned during my stay at the World 
Bank during the last couple of years.
I have learned to look at the world mainly as one interconnected and 
interdependent ‘Life Support System’. From that perspective it has 
become very clear to me that this system is in effect in many respects 
out of balance; that crucial balances are disturbed or are underway of 
becoming so. This is quite evident for the monetary system which 
has come broken. But in my view this is only one manifestation of the 
crisis we are in. At the same time we have crises with climate change, 
the energy system, water and food, maybe even beyond that with 
the availability of essential resources like forests, fertile land and fish 
stocks in the high seas and biodiversity is declining.
All of this is primarily, −Nancy also mentioned that− a threat to 
those people who live from only a couple of dollars a day or less. But 
ultimately it will impact in a negative way the quality of life, and if we 
don’t change our ways, ultimately life itself of all people and all living 
species on the planet. The combination of 6.5 billion people and our 
present way of life, of producing and consuming, creates a claim on 
the planets resources that is not sustainable. We want and use more 
than is available in a sustainable way. Our ecological footprint is ex-
ceeding the sustainable so called carrying capacity of the earth at this 
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point by at least 25 per cent. In fact, looking from that perspective, we 
are consuming the future. And again, looking from this perspective 
also shows the common background of the credit crisis and the eco-
logical and related social crises. Both cases are about living on credit, 
about borrowing from the future. Labeling it in that way, it is in fact a 
cultural crisis. It is a crisis of especially our western way of life. Look-
ing forward, this can only get worse with seven, eight or possibly 
nine billion people on the planet. Unless, and that is the main thing, 
we change the nature and the structure of our economies, the way we 
cater for our needs.
So the big challenge in the 21st century is to develop a culture, a way 
of life, a way of producing and consuming that is compatible in a 
sustainable way with the carrying capacity of the earth. That repre-
sents a really big challenge, but also one, and that is the good news, 
that is quite achievable, based on all that I have seen and on reports of 
the World Bank, but also on different research results that have been 
published, I am of the opinion that the concepts and the technologies 
necessary to make that change are already available. We know what 
we have to do and we already have the knowledge and the related 
technologies to do it. So what it comes down to now is creating 
awareness, political will and capacity to execute what is needed. I am 
not trying to say that this is going to be easy; to the contrary, it will 
be an uphill battle. Not because we don’t know what to do and how 
to do it, but it will directly counter the vested interests in business, in 
people’s lives and in the interests vested in national governments. So 
that, especially in the Western world, is going to be the real battle. 
But, there is not much of a choice. In fact, I think there is no choice. 
The mayor issues of our time are global in nature and related to the 
very base of life itself. They are life threatening issues. The only way 
to confront these issues effectively is by a common effort, directed 
and coordinated at the global level. And that is why I strongly sup-
port Nancy’s proposal for a global social contract. That is really the 
way to do it. It is also the way we have approached development at 
the national level. In Europe we added the European level of deci-
sion making to tackle issues beyond the national reach. Now time 
has come to make the move to the global level. In order to create and 
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execute a global social contract that effectively addresses global is-
sues, we urgently need an updated system of global governance. The 
present system dates from the post Second World War time. It does 
not reflect our 21st century world and it is not suited to deal with the 
present global issues. What is required first of all is acceptance by 
nation states that dialogue and subsequent cooperation at the global 
level are an absolute necessity to address the issues facing us. I think 
that the subsidiarity principal that guided the development of the 
European Union in recent years, could also serve us quite well at 
the global level. This is about delegating the issues that we can’t deal 
with effectively at the lower level, to the next higher level. We need 
effective global institutions to deliver global public goods such as the 
eradication of poverty, monetary stability, security, sustainable use of 
eco resources, a fair global trade system and also effective health care 
systems to prevent pandemics. 
The existing global institutions are insufficient at this point, and also 
lack legitimacy. Institutions like the imf and the World Bank urgently 
need reform, or even transformation into real 21st century institu-
tions, reflecting 21st century realities and being mandated to act in the 
interest of the world as a whole, instead of being dominated by some 
major shareholders and interests in countries of these major share-
holders.
My hope is that this will become possible because of the seriousness 
of the issues we are dealing with; but also because of what I see as 
the emergence of a ‘multi-polar world power structure’. This would 
mean that nation states really open up for more cooperation in order 
to get things done. Of course much will depend on the approach that 
the new US-president and administration will take. My guess is that 
Barack Obama holds the view that cooperation on issues of common 
interest should be pursued, even if there is difference of opinions 
on other issues. That is also why he says: “I am going to talk to what 
Mr. Bush labels as ‘enemies’.” He wants to seek the common ground. 
That is anyway my impression after having watched him very closely 
during the campaign.
So in my view, in the next couple of years, a window of opportunity 
might open up to create a global governance network. I think about 
global public goods and global governance: an agenda
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it as a network of institutions that is better suited to tackle the huge 
challenges facing humanity in the next few decades. Of course, it re-
mains to be seen, what kind of influence the present credit crisis and 
recession will have on all of this. It might go both ways. I am realistic 
enough to see that. It might be helpful in the sense of bringing the 
message home that cooperation is the only way out, but it could also 
be an impediment to develop the kind of cooperation that is needed.
What I discussed so far, fully in agreement with Nancy’s introduc-
tion, is the need for a global social contract and a transformed global 
governance system. But that still leaves open how the system should 
operate in fostering development.
So next, I will share with you some thoughts about development 
cooperation or, as it is still called internationally, development aid. 
Again, here I am in agreement with Nancy. The emphasis should shift 
from development aid as primarily unilateral charity to the broader 
notion of development cooperation seen as working together to fur-
ther common interest. This shift can also be helpful in the quite tense 
debate about the future of development cooperation that is going on 
in our country at this point. In the past, development aid has mainly 
been ‘sold’ as solidarity with the poor. There is nothing wrong with 
that. In itself, that is noble, but I think it will be insufficient to tackle 
the world’s problems.
If the world is one interconnected and interdependent system, if 
we are in this boat together, it is in our own self-interest to support 
developing nations. It is our own interest to tackle in a common effort 
the huge challenges these countries are facing. And if we don’t do 
that, we will experience the consequences in the form of scarcities, 
unchecked climate change, failing states, terrorism and migration 
flows. We have to give these people a reason to stay where they, to 
keep those parts of the world habitable. We have to move beyond 
development as charity and the paternalism that goes with that 
approach. Development cooperation in the real sense is supporting 
people to develop themselves, based on their preferences and fitting 
their specific circumstances and cultures. That might sound obvi-
ous, but I have seen too much of the old style “we know it and we 
should teach them how to do it” during the last couple of years. This 
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is the so called Washington Consensus. Extensive conditionality is 
just that: paternalism, we tell them how to do it. Fortunately, both 
– the Washington Consensus and conditionality – have eroded in the 
recent years, but the transformation to a well-coordinated country-
based and country-owned development model is far from completed. 
In my experience that goes back to donor countries, wanting to keep 
waving their own flags and following national priorities that they can 
sell to national electorates.
In an institution like the World Bank there is a lot of resistance, both 
from donor countries and from staff, to decentralization of opera-
tions. By opposing this really needed change, they oppose what 
Chang was talking about: differentiation and increasing the capacity 
of this institution to address specific circumstances and needs. 
I worked very hard during my years as an executive director and with 
full support of the Dutch government, to overcome that resistance. 
We have made some progress. Now, in the World Bank we are not 
talking any more about ‘if’ it has to happen, but how to do it and to 
what extend. That is the progress we have made. It remains to be seen 
how far this will go. It might take a far reaching overhaul of the Banks 
governance system, before we can turn the classic top-down devel-
opment model around. With around, I mean turn it upside down. 
What I would like to see happen in this context is the creation of a 
development model that combines the three of following features: 
One, a development model based on country ownership and country 
development programs with sufficient room for differentiation be-
tween countries, with specificity in the country programs. Secondly, 
country assistance strategies or country partnership strategies will 
have to function as a framework for a strong multilateral coordination 
and strengthening of the role and position of multilateral institutions. 
So: go multilateral, that is another point where I agree with Nancy. 
Thirdly development programmes at the national level and the sup-
port programmes in multilateral institutions will have to be embed-
ded in the global public goods approach. If you don’t address climate 
change for example in Africa, it is, as we say in Dutch: ‘dweilen met 
de kraan open.’ We really have to include the notion of global public 
goods into development policies.
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This model would probably also deal with one of the main points 
raised by Ha-Joon Chang: his criticism about the neo-liberal model 
of globalization. Although I might not be as critical as he is about 
certain market oriented policies, he really has a point in signaling 
the shortcomings of neoliberal market fundamentalism; especially, 
but not only, for developing countries. While visiting developing 
countries – and I got the opportunity to visit quite a few – I have come 
across several examples of governments rightly refusing to follow 
Bretton Woods’ advice. One was the government of Ethiopia, fol-
lowing a very cautious approach in developing the domestic banking 
sector and refusing, at least in this stage of development, to open this 
sector up for foreign banks. Certainly looking back from where we are 
today, that was pure wisdom. Further I visited Malawi, where I got 
some lectures about their fertilizer subsidies and got convinced that it 
was a very effective measure. They really solved a big domestic food 
production problem with introducing that subsidy. In the meantime 
the World Bank has followed suit and is now funding subsidized 
fertilizer programs in quite a few countries.
More generally, travelling in Africa I have met very competent people 
and very competent governments, knowing exactly what they want 
and how to develop their countries. All they need is our support. 
They don’t need lectures and preaches from our side. Wisdom about 
what works in today’s world is not our monopoly. I want to take this 
point even further. Our development stems from the industrial age, 
which in my view is now drawing to a close. At this point in time 
we are moving beyond the ideas that created the industrial age and 
developing new ways to organize societies and our economies. So it 
becomes increasingly doubtful whether that experience will be fully 
relevant for the future of developing countries.
We are moving from what I use to call a fossils-based economy to an 
economy based on what will ultimately be harvesting from natural 
flows. That especially goes for energy. Until today we are digging 
holes in the ground and mining fossils. But this is fast becoming 
a dead end street, mainly but not only for environmental reasons. 
What we will have to learn to do - and the technologies are already 
available - is to catch from the flow: solar, wind, biomass, hydro, geo-
thermal. This flow is abundant, especially in African countries, and 
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more generally in the tropical areas in the world. So they have a huge 
potential in developing economies based on sustainable resources 
and new technologies. I would be inclined to think that developing 
countries may well have an advantage here, because – and that is an-
other reason – they do not have an installed base of previous genera-
tion technologies which will be hampering us and putting at a break 
on that transition here in the west. Developing countries in a way can 
work from a blank sheet.
So, building the economies of these countries should be based on the 
new generation of concepts and technologies enabling sustainable 
ways of production. I see that as a huge opportunity. And we better 
refrain from telling them how we have done it, because that is not the 
reference they need. Exchanging experience and best practices in the 
future might well become a two-way-street, enhancing the notion of 
cooperation between equals.
That being said, I want to briefly comment on two points made by 
Ha-Joon. One is about the role of the state which in his view should 
get more emphasis. The other one is about global rules, and especially 
that these global rules should allow for asymmetry between develop-
ing and developed countries.
First, the role of the state. In my opinion, after the recent events and 
the mess we are in now, market fundamentalism has in a way taken 
care of itself. Even before that happened a reevaluation of the role 
of the state was underway. After studying development experience 
of a whole range of countries, the so called growth commission of 
the World Bank, created by my friend mr. Wolfowitz, came to the 
conclusion that strong government institutions and regulation are 
crucial ingredients of successful development policies. It was a group 
of market-oriented economists, who did that research and made that 
report.
In my view intelligent combinations of market systems and govern-
ment intervention will make the future. The mix of the two will de-
pend on the specific circumstances and the stage of development and 
of local preferences. I don’t see that as a choice between capitalism 
and socialism; that is not the issue. The issue is to find a way forward 
that is transcending this divide. We could do that by developing dif-
ferent blends in which the creativity and entrepreneurship of individ-
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uals is employed to its fullest extend, − that is an absolute necessary 
ingredient of development and also illustrates the need to continue 
market based policies -, is combined with ‘intelligent regulation and 
government intervention’ directed at working for the common good 
and to address the issues I have been talking about before.
The second point is asymmetry. I tend to be open to it, based on what 
I have seen over the years. If again, developing the poor countries is 
in our interest, I think we should be prepared to except for a num-
ber of reasons, at least temporarily, asymmetric trade rules. One, 
mentioned already, is that the notion of level playing field just works 
against the less developed. Another one is that, in the medium to 
long term, we will also benefit from it. Thirdly it is a powerful way 
to include developing countries in common efforts to address global 
issues. So we have to put something into the global contract that is 
really attractive to these countries, in order to make them agree with 
for example the Copenhagen agreement. A fourth point, which is 
kind of remote to this, but might also be addressed in that context, 
is that it might even help to tackle the issue of illicit financial flows. 
That is an issue not much discussed and not much open in the public 
domain, but it is a scandal. The financial flows leaving the developing 
countries every year are bigger, much bigger, than official oda-flows 
going from rich countries to the poor. In a way – it is a kind of a rude 
way of labeling it – in that sense colonialism is not over. Mispricing 
raw materials etcetera is something we have to look at. I would like to 
see it addressed in a new set of global rules. So, although this is a very 
tricky field, I would be inclined to carefully investigate what is pos-
sible in this domain as part of Nancy’s global social contract.
Let me go back now to the subject we are discussing this afternoon: 
Saving globalization from its cheerleaders. I have two remarks about 
the cheerleaders of globalization. First you have those who define 
globalization as an exclusively economic phenomenon, as increasing 
volumes of international trade. This brand of globalization has cer-
tainly made some positive contributions, but also, it was mentioned 
already this afternoon, exacerbated major problems in our world, like 
inequality and also some of the ecological issues. As such, I think this 
approach of globalization might quite well slow down in the coming 
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years, certainly when we start basing our economies increasingly on 
natural cycles, because that will slow down the trade in fossils. If that 
happens – and that is a possible future – economies will become more 
localized than they are today. There will be more local production 
than we have today. That is about one brand of globalization.
But you also have those who approach globalization as really un-
derstanding the interconnectedness, the interdependency and the 
common interest of all of us living on this planet. This brand, in my 
view, is on the rise. In a way, the fact that time has brought somebody 
like Barack Obama t0 power is proof of that. In terms of background, 
upbringing and ideas he is a reflection of this kind of globalization. 
My hope is that further increasing the understanding and awareness 
that the world is one interconnected and interdependent system will 
prepare the common ground and the common efforts necessary to ef-
fectively tackle the huge global issues we are facing. So looking at it in 
this way, I would say: saving globalization is about bringing the right; 
that is the second brand of cheerleaders to the fore. Thank you. 
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